How Law Becomes a Weapon: The Rise of Lawfare in Modern Warfare
- Manoj Ambat

- 17 hours ago
- 6 min read

War has never been confined to the battlefield alone. While popular imagination associates conflict with soldiers, tanks, and explosions, history tells a more complex story. Power has always been exercised not only through force, but also through rules, legitimacy, and control over narratives. In the 21st century, this quieter dimension of conflict has evolved into a powerful strategic instrument. This phenomenon is known as lawfare—the use of law as a weapon of warfare.
Lawfare represents a fundamental shift in how wars are fought and won. Instead of destroying enemy forces outright, lawfare seeks to constrain, delegitimise, and paralyse adversaries by exploiting legal systems, international norms, and institutional processes. It operates in the space between peace and war, shaping outcomes without triggering open hostilities. In an era where direct military conflict carries enormous political and economic costs, lawfare has become an attractive and effective alternative.
Traditional warfare is visible and decisive. Lawfare is subtle and cumulative. A missile strike creates immediate destruction; a legal manoeuvre may take years to produce results. Yet the strategic impact of lawfare can be just as profound. By delaying decisions, imposing reputational costs, restricting freedom of action, and shaping global perceptions, lawfare can weaken even the most powerful states without a single shot being fired.
The concept of lawfare is not entirely new. Throughout history, empires and states have used legal justifications to legitimise conquest and control. Colonial powers relied heavily on treaties, charters, and legal doctrines to formalise expansion. However, the modern form of lawfare took shape after the Second World War, with the rapid growth of international law, multilateral institutions, and global norms governing conflict, trade, maritime activity, and human rights.
The post-war legal order was designed to prevent another global catastrophe. It created rules to limit the use of force and promote peaceful dispute resolution. Ironically, this very framework created new avenues for competition and conflict. As military confrontation became riskier in the nuclear age, states began to pursue their strategic objectives through legal and institutional means. Law became not only a constraint on power, but also a tool of power.
Lawfare thrives in ambiguity. It exploits grey zones where legal interpretations overlap, norms are contested, and enforcement mechanisms are weak. Unlike conventional warfare, which relies on overwhelming force, lawfare relies on precision, patience, and narrative control. A carefully framed legal claim, a selective interpretation of international conventions, or a domestic law with extraterritorial implications can alter strategic realities over time.
One of the defining features of lawfare is its asymmetry. Military power often correlates with economic and technological strength. Legal power does not. Even relatively weaker actors can impose significant strategic costs on stronger opponents by leveraging international law, regulatory regimes, and public opinion. Democracies are particularly vulnerable to lawfare because of their commitment to rule of law, transparency, and international legitimacy. Authoritarian systems, by contrast, can selectively comply with legal norms while exploiting them against others.
In modern conflicts, lawfare rarely operates alone. It is usually part of a broader hybrid strategy that includes diplomatic pressure, economic coercion, information warfare, and limited military actions. Together, these tools allow states to pursue their objectives incrementally while avoiding escalation. Lawfare provides the moral and legal cover that makes such strategies sustainable over time.
A clear illustration of lawfare in practice can be seen in the maritime domain. Seas and oceans are governed by complex legal regimes that define territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, and navigational rights. Control over these legal definitions has immense strategic significance. Maritime law determines access to resources, trade routes, and military manoeuvre space. It is therefore no surprise that lawfare has become central to maritime competition in the Indo-Pacific.
China offers one of the most sophisticated examples of lawfare in the contemporary world. Its rise as a major power is often analysed through shipbuilding programs, missile deployments, and defence spending. Yet an equally important aspect of China’s strategy lies in its use of law as a strategic instrument. Beijing’s approach to international law is neither outright rejection nor full compliance. It is selective, adaptive, and calculated.
In disputed maritime regions, China has combined domestic legislation, administrative measures, and law enforcement actions to advance expansive claims. By enacting coast guard laws, regulating fishing activities, and asserting jurisdiction through civilian and paramilitary vessels, China has gradually altered realities at sea. These actions are often framed as legal enforcement rather than military aggression, complicating responses from other states.
Artificial islands and maritime infrastructure serve not only military purposes, but also legal ones. By creating physical presence where none previously existed, new claims are asserted and normalised over time. Even when international legal challenges arise, the strategic calculus remains unchanged. Legal rulings may be rejected, but the physical and administrative control often persists. This illustrates a core principle of lawfare: outcomes matter more than verdicts.
The effectiveness of such strategies lies in their long-term nature. Lawfare does not seek immediate recognition or universal approval. It seeks gradual acceptance. Over time, repeated assertions, administrative practices, and lack of effective counteraction create a new status quo. What was once contested becomes routine. What was once illegal becomes tolerated. This is the quiet power of lawfare.
The use of lawfare is not limited to any single country. Major powers have increasingly relied on legal and regulatory instruments to pursue strategic objectives. Sanctions regimes, export controls, and legal actions targeting finance and technology have become key tools of statecraft. These measures do not resemble traditional acts of war, yet their impact can be devastating. Entire industries can be disrupted, economies constrained, and strategic capabilities delayed or denied.
However, the widespread use of lawfare also carries risks. When law becomes a weapon, its legitimacy can erode. Selective enforcement and double standards undermine trust in international institutions. Legal systems designed to promote stability can instead become arenas of contestation. This contributes to a fragmented global order where rules apply unevenly and predictability declines.
For countries like India, the rise of lawfare presents a complex challenge. India is a status quo power with a strong commitment to international law and multilateralism. Its strategic credibility is closely linked to its reputation as a responsible actor. This provides moral authority, but it can also impose constraints in an increasingly competitive environment.
India’s strategic interests, particularly in the maritime domain, are deeply intertwined with legal norms. Stable sea lanes, clear maritime boundaries, and respect for international conventions are essential for India’s security and economic growth. At the same time, India operates in a region where legal and quasi-legal strategies are increasingly used to advance territorial and strategic claims. Passive reliance on law is no longer sufficient.
The challenge for India is not whether to uphold international law, but how to engage with it strategically. Lawfare does not require abandoning legal principles. It requires understanding how law can be used, misused, and countered. Strategic legal literacy must become an integral part of national security planning. Military planners, diplomats, and legal experts must operate in close coordination.
In the future, the separation between law and warfare will continue to erode. Legal considerations already shape military planning, rules of engagement, and operational decisions. At the same time, strategic calculations influence legal positions and interpretations. This convergence demands new forms of expertise and institutional capacity.
The battlefield of the future will not be limited to physical domains. It will extend into courtrooms, arbitration panels, regulatory bodies, and international organisations. Strategic documents, legal submissions, and narrative framing will play decisive roles. Victory and defeat will not always be clear-cut. Instead, conflicts will be characterised by frozen disputes, incremental gains, and contested legitimacy.
Lawfare also challenges traditional notions of deterrence. Military deterrence relies on visible capabilities and credible threats. Legal deterrence operates through uncertainty and reputational risk. A state facing potential legal consequences may hesitate to act, even when militarily capable. This hesitation itself becomes a strategic advantage for the actor employing lawfare.
Ultimately, lawfare reflects the changing nature of power in a globalised world. Power is no longer exercised solely through force. It is exercised through institutions, norms, and perceptions. Legitimacy has become a form of currency. States that understand how to shape and protect legitimacy will have an advantage in the conflicts of the future.
The most consequential wars of the 21st century may not be remembered for decisive battles or dramatic victories. They may be remembered for legal precedents, regulatory frameworks, and institutional outcomes. In such a world, the ability to navigate lawfare is not optional. It is essential.
Law has not replaced warfare. It has become part of it. The pen has not merely become mightier than the sword. In many cases, it has become the sword itself.
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