Japan Is Rearming — Why India Should Welcome It
For decades, Japan's military power was constrained by the extraordinary legacy of the Second World War, constitutional limitations, domestic political caution and a strategic dependence on the United States. Japan deliberately built a security model in which the Self-Defense Forces were primarily oriented towards national defence while the United States provided the wider military umbrella. That model is now undergoing a profound transformation. Japan is expanding its defence expenditure, strengthening its missile-defence architecture, acquiring longer-range stand-off weapons, modernising its naval and air capabilities, investing in unmanned systems and increasingly building the ability to respond to threats before they reach Japanese territory. Much of the international discussion describes this as Japanese "rearmament" or a return of Japanese military power. But there is a crucial question that receives considerably less attention: what does the emergence of a militarily stronger Japan mean for India? From an Indian strategic perspective, Japan's military transformation should not automatically be regarded as a dangerous return to the past. It can instead be understood as the emergence of another capable Asian power at a time when the regional balance of power is being transformed by the rise of China.
The Western interpretation of Japanese rearmament naturally focuses on the US-Japan alliance and the challenge posed by China. From Beijing, the same development is viewed through a very different historical and strategic lens, with Japanese military expansion frequently portrayed as a revival of militarism. India, however, occupies a different strategic position. New Delhi is neither a Japanese ally in the American sense nor a Chinese rival operating from the same geographical theatre as Japan. India has its own strategic autonomy, its own interests and its own assessment of the Indo-Pacific. Yet India and Japan increasingly share a fundamental concern: the rapid expansion of Chinese economic, naval, technological and military power. China is a direct continental challenge to India along the Himalayan frontier and an increasingly important maritime factor in the Indian Ocean, while Japan faces Chinese military power in the East China Sea and the wider Western Pacific. Their theatres are different, but the larger strategic problem is connected. A stronger Japan therefore has the potential to create an additional point of strategic pressure on China, and that is something India has a clear interest in encouraging.
Japan's Military Transformation Is About More Than Defence Spending
The significance of Japan's transformation cannot be measured simply by looking at the amount of money Tokyo is allocating to defence. The more important change is qualitative. Japan is developing a military that can detect threats earlier, operate over greater distances, coordinate multiple domains and impose greater costs on an adversary. Its defence planning increasingly emphasises stand-off weapons, integrated air and missile defence, unmanned systems, advanced sensors, command-and-control networks, maritime surveillance and the ability to respond to attacks from greater distances. Japan's evolving capabilities therefore represent a gradual movement away from an extremely narrow interpretation of territorial defence towards a more comprehensive concept of deterrence. This does not necessarily mean that Japan is preparing for offensive warfare in the traditional sense. Rather, Tokyo increasingly believes that merely possessing the ability to defend Japanese territory after an attack has begun may no longer be sufficient in an environment dominated by long-range missiles, sophisticated naval forces, cyber capabilities, satellites and increasingly capable Chinese military systems. The strategic philosophy is consequently shifting towards deterrence through credible capability.
That distinction is important when discussing the word "rearmament." Contemporary Japan is not simply attempting to reconstruct the Imperial Japanese military of the pre-1945 period. The political, institutional and international environment is fundamentally different. Japan is a democratic state operating within an alliance with the United States and increasingly within a network of partnerships with countries such as India and Australia. Its military transformation is being driven primarily by the perception that the strategic environment around Japan has deteriorated. China has become a much more powerful military and naval actor, North Korea possesses increasingly sophisticated missile capabilities, and Russia's military posture in the broader Asia-Pacific region remains a concern. Japan's response is therefore better understood as an attempt to ensure that its existing security architecture remains credible in a much more dangerous strategic environment. For India, this distinction matters because the emergence of Japanese military power does not necessarily represent the return of an expansionist Japan. It can instead represent the emergence of a more capable Japan that is determined to prevent coercion against itself.
Why India Should Pay Attention
From New Delhi's perspective, the most important consequence of Japanese rearmament is the creation of another capable military power in Asia. China's rise has produced a strategic problem for India that cannot be addressed exclusively along the Himalayan frontier. Chinese military power is increasingly multidimensional. The People's Liberation Army Navy is expanding its ability to operate across the Indo-Pacific, China's missile forces provide Beijing with long-range strike options, its air power is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and its maritime presence extends progressively further into the Indian Ocean. India cannot realistically respond to every aspect of this expansion by itself. Nor does it need to. India's strategic advantage can come from building relationships with other capable powers whose interests overlap with its own. Japan is particularly valuable because of its geographical position and technological capabilities. A stronger Japanese military forces Beijing to consider a much more complicated Western Pacific environment at precisely the same time that China must consider developments in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, the Indian Ocean and along the Himalayan frontier. The more theatres China must account for, the more complicated its strategic calculations become.
This is why India's interest in Japanese rearmament should not be interpreted as a desire to create an anti-China military alliance. That would be too simplistic and would not reflect India's traditional strategic autonomy. India does not need Japan to fight China's battles on India's behalf, nor does India need to become part of a rigid alliance structure. What India benefits from is a regional balance in which China cannot assume that its growing military power will automatically translate into strategic dominance. If Japan possesses sufficient maritime, air, missile and technological capabilities to impose significant costs on Chinese military planning in the Western Pacific, then China has to devote greater attention and resources to that theatre. The effect can be indirect but strategically meaningful for India. A stronger Japan does not have to confront China on India's behalf. It simply has to be strong enough to make Chinese strategic planning more difficult.
India and Japan Are Already Moving Beyond an Economic Relationship
This is where the India-Japan relationship becomes especially important. For many years, Japan's relationship with India was viewed primarily through the economic lens. Japanese investment, infrastructure development, industrial cooperation, technology and development assistance created a substantial foundation for bilateral relations. But the relationship has gradually expanded into strategic and defence affairs. India and Japan now describe their relationship as a Special Strategic and Global Partnership, and cooperation encompasses security, defence, economic security, critical technologies, infrastructure, supply chains and the wider Indo-Pacific. This evolution is significant because strategic partnerships become much more resilient when they are supported by multiple layers of cooperation. A relationship that exists only because two governments happen to share a temporary geopolitical concern can weaken when circumstances change. A relationship that encompasses investment, infrastructure, technology, military cooperation, diplomatic coordination and economic security is much more difficult to reverse.
The economic relationship is particularly important because Japanese investment has contributed to some of India's most significant infrastructure and industrial projects, while Japan increasingly sees India as an important partner in building resilient supply chains and diversifying economic dependence. The relationship therefore has a strategic dimension that extends beyond conventional trade. Japan has an interest in India's economic rise, while India benefits from Japanese capital, technology and industrial expertise. At the same time, both countries increasingly recognise the importance of economic security in an era where supply chains themselves have become instruments of strategic competition. The result is an unusual combination: Japan can contribute to India's economic and technological development while India can become an increasingly important strategic partner for Japan in the Indo-Pacific. That combination gives the relationship a depth that goes far beyond traditional diplomatic friendship.
Defence Cooperation Is Becoming Increasingly Practical
The military relationship is evolving in parallel. India and Japan conduct regular exercises and defence exchanges, including Exercise Dharma Guardian between their armies, while the two countries also cooperate through maritime and air exercises and increasingly frequent strategic and defence dialogues. Such exercises are important not because a few hundred soldiers training together can suddenly alter the balance of power, but because military relationships are built through repetition. Officers learn each other's procedures, commanders become familiar with one another's planning cultures, forces learn to communicate and operate together, and governments gradually develop confidence in one another's strategic intentions. Over time, these seemingly modest interactions create something much more valuable: strategic familiarity and interoperability. India and Japan are not a formal military alliance, and there is no reason to pretend otherwise. But the steady expansion of military cooperation demonstrates that the relationship is moving well beyond symbolism.
The next logical stage should be deeper defence-industrial and technological cooperation. Japan possesses extraordinary strengths in precision manufacturing, electronics, sensors, maritime technology, shipbuilding, robotics and advanced industrial systems. India, meanwhile, possesses a large industrial base, an expanding defence manufacturing sector, significant engineering capabilities and an enormous domestic requirement for military technology. There is therefore considerable scope for the two countries to move beyond a buyer-seller relationship and towards co-development, co-production and resilient supply chains. Such cooperation could eventually encompass unmanned systems, maritime surveillance, advanced electronics, sensors, communications, shipbuilding and other technologies relevant to the Indo-Pacific. If successfully developed, this could become one of the most strategically valuable dimensions of the India-Japan relationship because it would strengthen not only bilateral defence capabilities but also the technological resilience of both countries.
A Stronger Japan Complicates China's Strategic Calculus
Japan's geography gives it a particularly important role in the Indo-Pacific balance. The Japanese archipelago sits close to China's eastern maritime approaches and alongside some of the most strategically sensitive waters in the Western Pacific. Japanese air and naval forces, missile-defence systems, surveillance capabilities and increasingly long-range strike options therefore have the potential to influence Chinese military planning. From Beijing's perspective, the challenge is not simply whether Japan can defeat China in a conventional war. The more important question is whether Japan can make Chinese military operations sufficiently costly and uncertain that Beijing must allocate significant forces and resources to dealing with the Japanese theatre. This is the essence of deterrence. A military does not necessarily have to fight a war to influence the outcome of strategic competition. If its capabilities convince an adversary that aggression will carry unacceptable costs, it has already achieved an important strategic objective.
For India, that effect has indirect value. China's strategic resources are finite, even though its military capabilities are expanding rapidly. Beijing must consider its western frontier with India, its maritime approaches, Taiwan, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, its relationship with Russia and its wider competition with the United States. A stronger Japan increases the complexity of that equation. This is why the Indian perspective on Japanese rearmament is fundamentally different from simply celebrating the military expansion of another country. India is interested in the distribution of power. If power becomes concentrated overwhelmingly in the hands of one regional actor, the strategic environment becomes dangerous for every other major Asian power. If power is distributed among several capable states, coercion becomes more difficult and strategic autonomy becomes more achievable.
The Indo-Pacific Is Becoming a Network of Partnerships
The future security architecture of Asia is unlikely to resemble NATO in Europe. Instead, it is increasingly becoming a network of overlapping partnerships, bilateral relationships and issue-specific strategic arrangements. India has relationships with Japan, Australia, the United States, France and several Southeast Asian countries, while Japan maintains its central alliance with Washington and simultaneously develops stronger security relationships with India, Australia, the Philippines and other Indo-Pacific partners. The Quad is one manifestation of this broader network, but it is not the entirety of India's strategic architecture. This distinction is important because India's objective is not to construct a single anti-China alliance. It is to create a regional environment in which no single power can easily dominate the Indo-Pacific.
A stronger Japan fits naturally into that architecture. Japan does not need to become India's military ally in the formal sense, just as India does not need to become a Japanese ally against China. What matters is that both countries develop enough strategic convergence that they can cooperate when their interests coincide. Maritime security is one such area. Defence technology is another. Supply-chain resilience, critical infrastructure, cyber security, space, emerging technologies and the security of sea lanes offer further opportunities. This networked approach is actually more compatible with India's strategic culture than a rigid alliance system. India can deepen cooperation with Japan while maintaining its own strategic autonomy, just as Japan can strengthen its partnership with India while retaining its alliance with the United States.
India Should Welcome Japanese Strength — But With Strategic Realism
There is, however, an important caveat. India should welcome Japanese military strengthening without assuming that Japan will automatically share every Indian strategic objective. Japan's primary responsibility is the defence of Japan. Its immediate security concerns are centred on China, North Korea and Russia, while the US alliance remains fundamental to its defence policy. India's strategic priorities are different. India must simultaneously manage the China-Pakistan strategic relationship, the Himalayan frontier, the Indian Ocean, its neighbourhood and its broader maritime interests. The two countries therefore have overlapping interests rather than identical interests. This is precisely why India should approach the relationship with strategic realism. Partnership does not require identical objectives. It requires sufficient convergence to make cooperation worthwhile.
That convergence is already substantial and can become more important as Japanese military power grows. India benefits from a Japan that is secure, technologically advanced, economically strong and capable of defending its own interests. It benefits even more from a Japan that can contribute meaningfully to maintaining the balance of power in the Western Pacific. At the same time, Japan benefits from a stable, economically powerful and strategically capable India occupying the central position in the Indian Ocean. The two countries therefore possess a form of strategic complementarity. Japan is positioned towards the Western Pacific; India dominates the central Indian Ocean geography. Their strategic cooperation does not require them to become one military bloc. Their geography itself creates complementary strategic value.
The Opportunity for a Deeper India-Japan Partnership
The next decade could therefore be particularly important. India and Japan have the opportunity to transform their relationship from a broad strategic partnership into one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in the Indo-Pacific. That does not mean signing a traditional defence alliance. It means building a dense network of practical cooperation: more military exercises, greater information sharing, deeper maritime cooperation, defence technology partnerships, industrial collaboration, resilient supply chains, space cooperation, unmanned systems, cyber security and coordination within the wider Indo-Pacific framework. India should also encourage Japanese investment in Indian manufacturing and infrastructure because economic interdependence can reinforce strategic cooperation. The objective should be to make India and Japan increasingly useful to each other without either country surrendering strategic autonomy.
This is also where the rise of China becomes relevant without becoming the sole definition of the relationship. India-Japan relations should not be reduced to "countering China." That would make the partnership unnecessarily narrow. The two countries have substantial interests in economic development, technology, maritime security, infrastructure, energy, supply-chain resilience and regional stability that exist independently of China. But the reality is that China's growing power has made these areas strategically more important. A stable Indo-Pacific requires capable countries, resilient economies and credible deterrence. Japan and India can contribute to all three.
Strategic Vanguard View
Japan's military transformation should therefore be understood differently in India from how it is commonly presented in Western or Chinese narratives. The historical memory of Imperial Japan cannot simply be erased, and legitimate questions about constitutional constraints, military doctrine and the long-term direction of Japanese defence policy deserve serious consideration. But contemporary Japan is operating in a fundamentally different political and strategic environment. Its military expansion is taking place within a democratic system, within a US alliance and alongside an expanding network of partnerships with countries such as India and Australia. The central strategic question for New Delhi should therefore not be whether Japan is becoming "militaristic" again. It should be whether Japanese military power contributes to a more balanced and stable Indo-Pacific.
From India's perspective, the answer is increasingly yes. India does not need Japan to fight China's battles. India does not need Japan to become an Indian military ally. And India certainly does not need to abandon strategic autonomy in order to benefit from Japanese strength. What India needs is a regional environment in which China's growing power is balanced by other capable states. A stronger Japan contributes directly to that objective. Japanese naval and air power can complicate Chinese planning in the Western Pacific. Japanese missile and surveillance capabilities can strengthen regional deterrence. Japanese technology and investment can contribute to India's economic and industrial transformation. Joint military exercises can gradually build interoperability and trust. And a deeper India-Japan partnership can create another durable pillar in the wider Indo-Pacific strategic network.
The great strategic opportunity is therefore not to build an anti-China alliance, but to build a balanced Asia. India should welcome a Japan that is strong enough to defend itself, confident enough to protect its interests and capable enough to impose serious costs on any attempt at coercion. Such a Japan does not diminish India's strategic autonomy. It strengthens the environment in which that autonomy can operate. In an Asia increasingly shaped by the rise of Chinese power, India does not have to confront every challenge alone. It can work with other major powers whose interests increasingly converge with its own.
India does not need Japan to fight China for it. India benefits simply from Japan becoming strong enough that China has to think twice.
That may ultimately be the most important strategic consequence of Japan's military revival.
For India, therefore, Japanese rearmament should not necessarily be seen as the return of an old threat.
It may be the emergence of a new strategic opportunity.
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