Rising China — The Strategic Challenges for India

Manoj Ambat, Editor in Chief, Strategic Vanguard
Sep 19
6 min read

The Asian century is unfolding amidst an intense geopolitical rivalry between two ancient civilizations—China and India. Once aligned under the banner of post-colonial solidarity, they now find themselves locked in a contest for regional primacy and global influence. From the Himalayas to the high seas, from trade corridors to technology supply chains, their competition defines the strategic architecture of the Indo-Pacific.

Back in February 2018, when Strategic Vanguard first examined the “Rising China” phenomenon, the world was still reeling from the Doklam standoff. India had returned from the brink of confrontation, and there was hope that diplomacy would prevail. Yet, the last seven years have shown that this rivalry is not episodic but structural. The deadly clash in Galwan Valley in 2020 shattered decades of peace, and even though relations are now showing signs of thaw, the underlying faultlines remain.

The core reality is that China has emerged as the pre-eminent Asian power and seeks to reshape the regional order. India, while rising, faces the strategic compulsion of resisting Chinese hegemony while safeguarding its own development trajectory. This article revisits the journey from 2018 to 2025 and explores the challenges, opportunities, and the path ahead.

Doklam: Prelude to Confrontation

The Doklam plateau crisis of 2017 marked the first major military face-off between India and China in decades. Located at the tri-junction of India, Bhutan, and China, the standoff arose when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) attempted to extend a road into territory claimed by Bhutan, which India viewed as critical to its security. For 73 days, troops were locked in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.

While a disengagement deal eventually ended the crisis, it revealed the scale of China’s salami-slicing tactics—incremental encroachments backed by infrastructure build-up and diplomatic pressure. It also exposed India’s vulnerabilities in terms of border logistics. The Doklam episode catalysed India’s renewed focus on road and airstrip construction along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and highlighted the need for forward posture.

Galwan Valley: The Turning Point

If Doklam was the spark, Galwan Valley was the blaze. On the night of 15 June 2020, soldiers from both sides clashed in the icy heights of eastern Ladakh, resulting in the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and an undisclosed number of Chinese troops. This was the first combat fatality between the two militaries in 45 years.

The Galwan clash marked a fundamental rupture. Trust between the two militaries collapsed, and the old confidence-building measures were rendered obsolete. China had massed troops, armour, and artillery across multiple friction points including Pangong Tso, Gogra, Hot Springs, Depsang Plains, and Demchok. India responded with mirror deployments, emergency infrastructure works, and fast-tracked induction of advanced systems like Rafale fighters and M777 howitzer artillery.

For the first time in decades, India formally acknowledged China as its primary strategic challenge. The notion of “peace and tranquillity” as the basis of bilateral ties was dead.

Attempts at De-Escalation: Managing the Border

Between 2020 and 2024, both sides engaged in over 20 rounds of Corps Commander-level talks and multiple meetings of the Working Mechanism on Border Affairs (WMCC).

Disengagement was achieved in some sectors—like Pangong Tso (north and south banks) and Gogra-Hot Springs. However, major issues at Depsang Plains and Demchok remain unresolved.

India also undertook a major infrastructure push: new all-weather roads, bridges like Bailey Bridge, Galwan, forward airbases, and advanced surveillance networks. This reduced the PLA’s tactical edge and enhanced rapid mobilisation capacity. China, for its part, has built fortified bunkers, permanent helipads, and underground storage near the LAC.

This “armed co-existence” has created a tense but stable front—fragile, yet functional. The risk of accidental escalation remains, but both sides appear intent on preventing a repeat of Galwan.

Diplomatic Reset: The 2024–25 Thaw

Despite military tensions, 2024 saw tentative diplomatic re-engagement. At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, Indian and Chinese leaders met on the sidelines and agreed to “restore normalcy” gradually. Journalistic visas were reinstated, border trade points reopened, and cultural exchanges resumed.

This came as both economies faced external headwinds—especially after new tariffs by the United States on Chinese goods and retaliatory measures affecting Indian exports. Both Delhi and Beijing sought to stabilise ties to protect trade flows and regional mechanisms like the BRICS and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

However, this détente is transactional, not transformational. Neither side has altered its core positions on the boundary dispute. The LAC remains militarised, and the political trust deficit endures.

The China–Pakistan Nexus

While border tensions dominated headlines, the more enduring challenge to India’s security lies in the deepening China–Pakistan partnership. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has given China a strategic stake in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Beijing has invested billions in ports like Gwadar, power plants, highways, and fibre optic links. More worrying is the growing military dimension—joint air exercises, PLAN access to Pakistani naval facilities, and intelligence-sharing arrangements. Chinese surveillance drones, reconnaissance satellites, and electronic warfare support have bolstered Pakistan’s capabilities against India.

This two-front dilemma compels India to spread its resources and plan for collusive contingencies. It has also pushed India to strengthen ties with other major powers.

Strategic Contest in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)

The maritime domain has emerged as a key arena of India–China rivalry. China’s dependence on seaborne trade—especially energy from the Middle East—makes the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) critical to its security. Over the past decade, China has pursued a “string of pearls” strategy: acquiring port footholds at Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Kyaukpyu (Myanmar), Gwadar (Pakistan), and its only overseas military base at Djibouti.

India, traditionally the net security provider in the IOR, has responded with a maritime modernisation drive. The Indian Navy has inducted new aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, and long-range patrol aircraft. India’s strategic location astride the Malacca Strait chokepoint, backed by its presence in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, gives it leverage to monitor and potentially interdict Chinese shipping in crisis scenarios.

India has also intensified security partnerships through the Quad alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia—conducting joint naval drills and coordinating IOR surveillance. This Indo-Pacific network is central to balancing China’s maritime push.

Economic Interdependence and Strategic Decoupling

Even as security tensions rise, India-China economic ties remain substantial. China is still India’s largest source of imports, from electronics to active pharmaceutical ingredients. Bilateral trade has crossed $130 billion annually. Yet, the strategic trust deficit has triggered selective decoupling.

India has banned over 300 Chinese mobile apps (like TikTok), tightened scrutiny on Chinese FDI, and promoted domestic manufacturing through Atmanirbhar Bharat. Critical infrastructure sectors—telecom, power, ports—now have curbs on Chinese vendors. Supply chain diversification is a priority, with India wooing Western and East Asian firms relocating from China.

This delicate balance—economic engagement without strategic dependence—will shape India’s policy in the coming decade.

Geopolitical Overlay: The U.S. Factor and Multi-Alignment

The wider geopolitics further complicates the rivalry. China’s growing confrontation with the United States has indirectly benefitted India. U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods have created opportunities for India’s export sectors. Simultaneously, India has deepened defence cooperation with Washington through foundational agreements like Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA).

However, India remains committed to strategic autonomy. It continues close defence ties with Russia while engaging the West, and participates in forums like BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation that include China. This multi-alignment allows India to hedge against volatility but also demands delicate balancing.

India’s Strategic Options Going Forward

To safeguard its interests, India must pursue a layered strategy:

Hard Power: Accelerate border infrastructure, improve ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), deploy high-altitude drones, and build rapid mobilisation capability.
Diplomacy: Push for a border clarity framework, crisis hotlines, and renewed confidence-building measures.
Soft Power: Strengthen ties with neighbours to prevent Chinese encirclement and promote Indian cultural diplomacy.
Economic: Invest in high-tech manufacturing, reduce dependency on Chinese components, and enhance self-reliance in critical sectors like semiconductors, defence, and rare earths.

This holistic approach will allow India to deter Chinese aggression while maintaining engagement channels.

Persistent Challenges and Risks

India faces several enduring constraints. China’s economy is nearly five times larger, allowing sustained military outlays. China’s border infrastructure is more advanced, enabling faster deployments. The political systems differ radically—China’s centralised state allows rapid decision-making, while India’s democracy is slower but more resilient.

The Taiwan and South China Sea flashpoints could also affect India. Any U.S.–China conflict would reshape the strategic landscape, possibly forcing India to take sides. Domestic politics and nationalism in both countries risk inflaming tensions and limiting diplomatic space.

Conclusion: Living with the Dragon

Seven years after Doklam and five years after Galwan, the India–China relationship remains cold, armed, and competitive. Recent diplomatic thaw does not erase the fundamental structural rivalry. China continues to claim Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet” and blocks India’s aspirations in global institutions. It continues to arm and shield Pakistan.

India must therefore prepare for a long-term contest—deterring Chinese coercion, defending its territory, building its economy, and deepening partnerships, while managing tensions to avoid war. Strategic patience, coupled with strength, is the only viable path.

The dragon will not disappear from Asia’s skies—but the elephant must grow strong enough to walk alongside it, unbowed and unafraid.

( This article was written by me in 2018 and is now updated. To read the original article please click here: https://strategicvanguard.blogspot.com/2018/02/rising-china-challenges-for-india.html )

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